Friends, I made a mistake in the designation “skin in the game”; it is ambiguous and is often mistaken for incentives. “Neck on the line” is more adequate, though ominous. But, even better and more ludic, “neck in the game”. How does “Neck in the game” sound? Explicit enough without being ominous?
I am considering revising by putting “neck” in place of “skin”.
via Friends, I made a mistake in the designation… – Nassim Nicholas Taleb.
SKIN-IN-THE-GAME: Eye for eye 3ayn ta7at 3ayn is not literal. One can’t inflict exactly the same pubishment: what if the other person happens to be blind? If a doctor amputates the wrong leg, there has to be another solution than amputate the doctor’s leg.
(I thank Marc Abrahams for Talmudic advice/guidance/training.)
via SKIN-IN-THE-GAME: Eye for eye 3ayn… – Nassim Nicholas Taleb | Facebook.
SEPTEMBER 9, 2013
Taleb on Skin in the Game
Nassim Taleb Hosted by Russ Roberts
Nassim Taleb of NYU-Poly talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about his recent paper with Constantine Sandis on the morality and effectiveness of “skin in the game.” When decision makers have skin in the game–when they share in the costs and benefits of their decisions that might affect others–they are more likely to make prudent decisions than in cases where decision-makers can impose costs on others. Taleb sees skin in the game as not just a useful policy concept but a moral imperative. The conversation closes with some observations on the power of expected value for evaluating predictions along with Taleb’s thoughts on economists who rarely have skin in the game when they make forecasts or take policy positions.
Download Size:28.8 MB Right-click or Option-click, and select “Save Link/Target As MP3.
The Skin In The Game Heuristic for Protection Against Tail Events
Constantine Sandis
Oxford Brooks
Nassim Nicholas Taleb
NYU-Poly; Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne – Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne (CES)
July 30, 2013
Abstract:
Standard economic theory makes an allowance for the agency problem, but not the compounding of moral hazard in the presence of informational opacity, particularly in what concerns high-impact events in fat tailed domains. But the ancients did; so did many aspects of moral philosophy. We propose a global and morally mandatory heuristic that anyone involved in an action which can possibly generate harm for others, even probabilistically, should be required to be exposed to some damage, regardless of context. While perhaps not sufficient, the heuristic is certainly necessary hence mandatory. It is supposed to counter risk hiding in the tails. We link the rule to various philosophical approaches to ethics and moral luck.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 10
Keywords: RIsk management, Heuristics, Black Swans, Fragility, Ethics, Moral Philosophy, Probability
working papers series
Constantine Sandis and I have completed The Skin in the Game Paper, with derivations.
Nothing new for the members here but we placed it withing the philosophical traditions, particularly in what relates to moral luck. And we added mathematics to balance philosophy, with 2 (small) mistakes that Carl Fakhry Kimos (or another member here) will find within 24 hours.
Skin in the Game as a Required Heuristic for Acting Under Uncertainty by Constantine Sandis,…
We propose a global and morally mandatory heuristic that anyone involved in an action which can possibly generate harm for others,
via Constantine Sandis and I have completed… – Nassim Nicholas Taleb | Facebook.