Category Archives: Papers

156 The Pikettistas’ Reasoning Error

Reminded by a tweet that NNT frequently updates his notebook page.

A wealth tax meaning to punish the wealth generator is absurd: since the payoff is severely clipped on the upside, it would be a lunacy to be a risk taker with small probability bets, with wins of 20 (after tax) rather than 100, then disburse all savings progressively in wealth tax. The optimal strategy is to go become an academic or a French-style civil servant, the anti-wealth generators. To see the cross-sectional problem temporally: Compare someone with lumpy payoffs say an entrepreneur who makes $4.5 million every 20 years to a professor like Krugman who earns the same total over the period ($225K in taxpayer-funded income). The entrepreneur over the VERY SAME income ends up paying 75% in taxes, plus wealth tax on the rest while the rent-seeking tenured academic who doesn’t contribute to wealth formation pays, say 30%.)

The problem with economists is that they are not (with very few exceptions) familiar with fat tails and make general statements that violate the true probabilistic payoff. In Mediocristan changes over time are the result of the collective contributions of the center, the middle. In Extremistan these changes come from the tails. Sorry, if you don’t like it but that is purely mathematical

via Opacity.

Paper on the measurement of inequality almost done…

Paper on the measurement of inequality almost done. How people mismeasure it and flaws in Piketty’s approach.

Please make no comments on whether inequality is good or bad, etc. or engage in the politics of envy. This is a technical discussion about a technical *nonpolitical* problem.

https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B8nhAlfIk3QIbzRrRkhhc1RNY0U/edit

via Paper on the measurement of inequality almost… – Nassim Nicholas Taleb.

Silent Risk: Lectures on Fat Tails, (Anti)Fragility, and Asymmetric Exposures by Nassim Nicholas Taleb :: SSRN

Abstract:

The full-length book provides a mathematical framework for decision making and the analysis of (consequential) hidden risks, those tail events undetected or improperly detected by statistical machinery; and substitutes fragility as a more reliable measure of exposure. Model error is mapped as risk, even tail risk.

Risks are seen in tail events rather than in the variations; this necessarily links them mathematically to an asymmetric response to intensity of shocks, convex or concave.

The difference between “models” and “the real world” ecologies lies largely in an additional layer of uncertainty that typically (because of the same asymmetric response by small probabilities to additional uncertainty) thickens the tails and invalidates all probabilistic tail risk measurements – models, by their very nature of reduction, are vulnerable to a chronic underestimation of the tails.

So tail events are not measurable; but the good news is that exposure to tail events is. In “Fat Tail Domains” (Extremistan), tail events are rarely present in past data: their statistical presence appears too late, and time series analysis is similar to sending troops after the battle. Hence the concept of fragility is introduced: is one vulnerable (i.e., asymmetric) to model error or model perturbation (seen as an additional layer of uncertainty)?

Part I looks at the consequences of fat tails, mostly in the form of slowness of convergence of measurements under the law of large number: some claims require 400 times more data than thought. Shows that much of the statistical techniques used in social sciences are either inconsistent or incompatible with probability theory. It also explores some errors in the social science literature about moments (confusion between probability and first moment, etc.)

Part II proposes a more realistic approach to risk measurement: fragility as nonlinear (concave) response, and explores nonlinearities and their statistical consequences. Risk management would consist in building structures that are not negatively asymmetric, that is both “robust” to both model error and tail events. Antifragility is a convex response to perturbations of a certain class of variables.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 296

Keywords: Risk Management, Probability Theory

via Silent Risk: Lectures on Fat Tails, (Anti)Fragility, and Asymmetric Exposures by Nassim Nicholas Taleb :: SSRN.

Four Points Beginner Risk Managers Should Learn from Jeff Holman’s Mistakes in the Discussion of Antifragile by Nassim Nicholas Taleb :: SSRN

Four Points Beginner Risk Managers Should Learn from Jeff Holman’s Mistakes in the Discussion of Antifragile

Nassim Nicholas Taleb
New York University; Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne – Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne (CES)
December 16, 2013

Abstract:
Using Jeff Holman’s comments in Quantitative Finance to illustrate 4 critical errors students should learn to avoid: 1) Mistaking tails (4th moment) for volatility (2nd moment), 2) Missing Jensen’s Inequality, 3) Analyzing the hedging wihout the underlying, 4) The necessity of a numeraire in finance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 5

via Four Points Beginner Risk Managers Should Learn from Jeff Holman’s Mistakes in the Discussion of Antifragile by Nassim Nicholas Taleb :: SSRN.

Economists and Quant Risk Managers have been lining up from here to Cleveland…

Economists and Quant Risk Managers have been lining up from here to Cleveland to get at the ideas of The Black Swan… For 6 years now, with nothing to report, no substance.
Here is the first attack on my ideas in a decent academic journal… So full of mistakes that I will use it in a class lecture.
Article: “Four Points Beginner Risk Managers Should Learn from Jeff Holman’s Mistakes in the Discussion of Antifragile”

via Economists and Quant Risk Managers have been… – Nassim Nicholas Taleb.