People are natural skeptics, but speak in shortcuts that seem categorical but are not; when they say “bureaucrats don’t have courage” they mean “a high percentage of bureaucrats don’t have courage”, which is why proverbs and aphorisms are heuristic and economical, held to be imperfect approximations.
On the other hand, when an academic writes the overly hedged statement “it appears that under some conditions, there have been historically a high percentage of bureaucrats who did not prove have courage”, he generally truly believes that “all bureaucrats don’t have courage”.
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I am writing this because Aaron Haspel and I noticed that when I write the aphorism “most bureaucrats don’t have courage” it is transmitted and repeated in its shorter version: “bureaucrats don’t have courage”. Many of the nitpickers on the web are after the straw man of “generalization” when a heuristic is not categorical.
Category Archives: Contributors
Would-be Error Detectors: Suit Up | AllAboutAlpha
Taleb writes thus: “Many have the illusion that ‘because Kolmogorov-Smirnov is nonparametric’, it is therefore immune to the nature specific distribution under the test….”
What does that mean? The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a standard measure of how a certain data sample compares with a reference probability distribution. It focuses on the largest observed distance between the actual set and the corresponding figure in the referenced distribution. If the largest observed distance is acceptably low, then presumably the one is acceptably conformable to the other. This test is widely said to be “non-parametric,” which in this context means that it is free of question-begging assumptions.
So what Taleb contends here is that the nonparametric nature of that test is an illusion. This is part of his effort to discredit patch-up jobs. In his view, Kolmogorov-Smirnov is one of many ways in which quants persuade themselves that they at last have a fix on how fat those fat tails can really get. If true, this would allow the quants to return to their pre-crisis mechanical ideas about risk management. But it isn’t, and they shouldn’t.
Or, as Taleb puts it at his most eloquent, “Shkmolgorov-Smirnoff.” Though I’m not sure I could manage the pronunciation of that.
Taleb, Mystery and Conservatism | The Brussels Journal
‘Optionality’ involves recognizing the unexpected and unpredictable consequences of trial and error tinkering. Most inventions and discoveries are chance events; intelligence is involved in recognizing a good thing when you see it, even though you weren’t expecting it.
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So intelligence is employed in employing optionality, rather than needing a correct theory that explains why everything is the way it is, usually impossible, or predicting the future. Taleb’s recommendation is to rely on empirical observation as much as possible and to be skeptical about theories. Theories come and go, but the empirical remains stable. Weight training, properly done, will increase muscle size and strength. We don’t know why. Theories as to why are fragile. Today you get one explanation, tomorrow a new one.
via Taleb, Mystery and Conservatism | The Brussels Journal.
HatTip to Dave Lull
We invented language in order to be vague…
We invented language in order to be vague, if you sort of see what I mean.
via We invented language in order to be vague, if… – Nassim Nicholas Taleb.
Daniel Kahneman changed the way we think about thinking. But what do other thinkers think of him? | Science | The Observer
The first idea Danny gave me in Rome is that people do not perceive stand-alone objects, rather differences away from an anchor point. He said that it was not cultural: even the vision of babies was based on identifying variations. It was simply more economical for the brain to do so. Investors are more affected by changes in wealth than by wealth itself and they are very sensitive to the way information is presented to them; they are more unhappy if one tells them they have lost $10,000 (the variation) than if one informs them that their wealth is now $480,000 (the total). They just take a benchmark and react to variations from it. So one could make them react more rationally by modifying the anchor.
That small point was miraculous: upon my return to New York I forced the clients to write off the amount they were willing to lose during the year (like an insurance premium expensed at the beginning of the period). I then posted performance reports showing how much they “recovered”, ie, money not lost. It was a wonder pill: clients became excited as they treated the money not lost as if it were a profit.
The second – equally potent – point I learned is that people do not aggregate information properly. When the portfolio is composed of many trades, and the net performance is positive, though some trades were up while a few were down, the clients got excited when they only saw the net total, but not when they saw the details. A small loss in a trade more than compensated by gains elsewhere would turn them off, and cause them to interrupt my lunch for an urgent conversation.
I also learned that one can change people’s anchor to force them to have a realistic outlook on things. I am Lebanese and people keep bemoaning the relatively small tension in the wake of the Syrian civil war. But when I tell my mother to think of the turmoil that did not happen, her mood changes instantly.